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‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
NOW IN 7th YEAR
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Police 
Academy’s “Peer Read Publication” has entered its 
seventh year of printing. Back issues are available 
from 2001 on the “In Service: 10-8” website at:  
From the inaugural issue it was clear 
that this newsletter was not about 
flare. Rather, it was just a plain, 
content based publication dedicated 
to keeping the front line officer 
current with issues facing them on 
the street. Readers were told to 
feel free to copy the newsletter 
and pass it on to colleagues. 
From our tremendous e-mail 
response, we know this has 
happened. 
Police officers make 
decisions every day that 
require careful and 
prudent deliberation 
that will impact 
people’s lives, in some 
cases forever. Errors 
can be costly. If the 
cops screw up, cases, 
careers, and even lives can be at stake. 
There is an old saying, “Doctors bury their 
mistakes while lawyers send theirs to prison. Police 
officers do a little of both”.
In its 1997-1998 Annual Report, the Commission for 
Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) noted that policing was becoming more 
complex in terms of the legal regime that governs the 
rights of the accused and the admissibility of 
evidence. And further, the Commission stated:
RCMP officers need to keep up to date on 
developments in criminal law, especially those that 
affect the use of police powers, acceptable 
methods of gathering evidence, and the rights of 
accused persons. In reviewing complaints, the 
Commission frequently concludes that the police 
officer in question was unaware of an important 
element of the law he or she was attempting to 
enforce. This shortcoming is not confined to 
junior officers of the Force; some 
supervisors have given 
unsound advice to 
police under their 
command because 
they failed to consider 
all relevant provisions 
of a law. 
This observation was not 
restricted to the RCMP. In 
his 2001 report, “Evaluation 
of the Training Provided by 
the Police Academy at the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia”, Dr. Radford noted:
Worthy of special mention was 
that more than 70% of the police 
officers interviewed made 
spontaneous reference to the need 
for regular and useful legal updates. 
This is one reason why the “In Service: 
10-8” newsletter was created. After 
1,028 pages encompassing 616,046 words, 
“In Service:10-8” is proud to be a staple of so many 
police officers’ diets. 
      www.10-8.ca
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“I would like to be 
added to your 
electronic mailing 
list for the In Service newsletter. 
It has been made reference to 
several times over some of the training courses I have 
attended recently, and I would like to receive the 
material on a regular basis. I am currently a member [in 
Ontario] and believe the material published would be 
beneficial in our constantly changing work environment. 
Thank you.” - Police Officer, Ontario
*********
“I was wondering if you could add me to 
the distribution list for the 10-8 
newsletter? It’s a great read and it would 
be fabulous if I could get new issues sent to me 
directly.” - RCMP Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I was wondering if you could put me on 
your distribution list for the ‘10-8 
Newsletter’? It seems to be a great 
resource and it would be great to have it in the 
electronic version.” - Police Detective, Major Crime 
Section, British Columbia
*********
“Could you please add my email address to 
your electronic fan-out newsletter. I’ve 
found articles to be interesting as well as 
educational” - Conservation Officer, Saskatchewan
*********
“All of us out here really appreciate the 
time and effort you put into keeping us 
abreast of evolving legal issues.  I always 
refer to your publication first in preparing our 
Department's bi-annual Legal Update Seminars.” - 
Police Constable, British Columbia
*********
“Would you please include me on your 
e-mail list for the monthly publication. I 
can surely use this case law in training 
and practical applications.” - Police Sergeant, Ontario
*********
“I absolutely love your publication.  As a 
new officer (1 yr.) I am finding it 
interesting and invaluable.” - Police 
Canstable, British Columbia
www.10-8.ca
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“I can't remember how it came to be that 
I started receiving this newsletter but I 
want to thank you for sending it to me. I 
find it a very informative easy read that keeps up on 
the ever changing case law we have to deal with. My son 
just started on the job and would like to receive a copy 
as well.” - Police Officer, Ontario
*********
“For 7-years I have read your paper 
faithfully from the first tiny little issue 
to the grand 40-pagers. I post it every 
month on our Service's Intranet site for other 
members to read. Really appreciate the stuff you put 
together - like refresher training in a box.” - Police 
Sergeant, Manitoba
*********
“Can you please add me to your 
distribution list.  I find your publication 
very interesting and valuable. Many 
thanks.” - Police Constable, Drug Section, British 
Columbia
*********
“[A colleague] sent along your latest on-
line publication for 10-8. Excellent 
publication!!!  How can I get  an on-line 
subscription?” - Police Staff Sergeant, 
Ontario
*********
“I have heard many good things about your 
10-8 Newsletter and would be very 
interested in receiving information on how 
I can obtain a subscription, be it through email or 
regular mail.” - RCMP Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I am submitting this email requesting to 
get on your 10-8 newsletter list.  I have 
read a few of them and found them very 
informative and useful for training purposes.” - Police 
Constable, Training Branch, Ontario
*********
“I am currently in police recruit training, 
and our instructor showed our class your 
10-8 newsletter. I would really appreciate 
being added to the distribution list for this excellent 
publication.  Thank you.” - Police Constable, British 
Columbia
IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge 
your understanding of the 
law. Each question is based on a case featured in this 
issue. See page 27 for the answers.
1. The reasonable grounds threshold required for an 
investigative detention is lower than that required 
for an arrest.
 (a) True
 (b) False
2. If the police cannot corroborate the “criminal” 
aspect of a tip, they will never have enough grounds 
for an arrest.
 (a) True
 (b) False
3. The police may use the random stop powers under 
provincial highway traffic legislation as a general 
power of detention for investigative purposes 
unrelated to traffic enforcement.
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. When proceeding with a breathalyzer demand under 
the Criminal Code at an accident scene, the police 
officer must satisfy the court not only that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe the 
driver was impaired, but also that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe the 
accident occurred within the preceding three hours.
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. The police are not precluded from using reasonable 
persuasion to encourage a detained person to break 
their silence after their right to silence has been 
asserted following the exercise of the right to 
counsel.
 (a) True
 (b) False
Note-able Quote
It is not enough to aim. You must hit - Italian Proverbwww.10-8.ca
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ON-DUTY DEATHS DOWN
On-duty peace officer deaths in Canada fell by five 
last year. In 2006, six peace officers lost their 
lives on the job. This matches the 10-year lows of 
six deaths in 1998, 1999 and 2003.  
Over the last 10 years motor vehicles, not guns, 
continue to pose the greatest risk to officers. 
Since 1997, 34 officers have lost their lives in 
circumstances involving vehicles, including 
automobile and motorcycle accidents (23), vehicular 
assault (3), and being struck by a vehicle (8). These 
deaths account for nearly 43% of all on-duty 
deaths, which is more than twice the next leading 
causes of gunfire (15) and aircraft accidents (12). 
On average, eight officers lost their lives each year 
during the last decade, while 1997, 2002 and 2005 
had the most deaths at 11 per year. 
Constable David Mounsey
Ontario Provincial Police, ON
End of Watch: November 13, 2006
Cause of Death: Automobile Accident
2006 Roll of Honour
Constable John Goyer
Abbotsford Police Department, BC
End of Watch: April 19, 2006
Cause of Death: Duty Related Illness
Senior Constable John Atkinson
Windsor Police Service, ON
End of Watch: May 5, 2006
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Senior Constable Don Doucet
Sault Ste. Marie Police Service, ON
End of Watch: May 14, 2006
Cause of Death: Vehicular Assault
Constable Robin Cameron
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN
End of Watch: July 15, 2006
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Constable Marc Bourdages
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN
End of Watch: July 16, 2006
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Source: The Officer Down Memorial Page, www.odmp.org
www.10-8.ca
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by year)
Cause 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2 1 2 1 4 12
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 1 2 1 3 5 2 1 1 2 2 20
Drowned 1 1 1 1 4
Duty related illness 1 1
Fall 1 1
Gunfire 3 5 1 1 2 3 15
Heart attack 1 2 1 1 1 1 7
Motorcycle accident 1 2 3
Natural disaster 1 1
Stabbed 1 1 2
Struck by vehicle 3 2 2 1 8
Training accident 1 1 2
Vehicular assault 1 1 1 3
Total 6 11 7 6 11 7 9 6 6 11 80
U.S. On-Duty Deaths
During 2006, the U.S. lost 
142 peace officers. The 
top cause of death was 
gunfire (51) — including 
accidents — followed by 
automobile accidents (35),  vehicular assaults 
(16), and being struck by a vehicle (11).  The 
state of California lost the most officers (15), 
followed by 
Virginia (10) and 
the states of 
Florida, Illinois, 
New York, and 
Texas, each with 
eight. The average 
age of deceased 
officers was 37 
years and the 
average tour of 
duty was 10 years 
and 9 months. 
2006 U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause Total
Aircraft accident 3
Assault 2
Auto accident 35
Bomb 1
Duty related illness 2
Gunfire 48
Gunfire (accidental) 3
Heart attack 10
Motorcycle accident 7
Stabbed 1
Struck by vehicle 11
Vehicle pursuit 3
Vehicular assault 16
Total 142
U.S. On Duty Deaths by Gender
Source: The Officer Down Memorial Page, www.odmp.org
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s.249.2 Criminal Code
Everyone who by criminal negligence causes death to another person 
while street racing is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for life. 
Section 249.2 creates an indictable offence to cause 
death while street racing:
Section 249.4 creates a dual offence for dangerous 
operation of a motor vehicle while street racing and 
indictable offences for dangerous operation causing 
bodily harm or death:
s.249.3 Criminal Code
Everyone who by criminal negligence causes bodily harm to another 
person while street racing is guilty of an indictable offence and liable 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
NEW LAW: STREET RACING
On December 14, 2006 a new law 
came into force addressing 
street racing. New crimes 
were created for street 
racing based on dangerous 
driving and criminal negligence 
offences. Furthermore, in street 
racing situations, this new law increases the maximum 
punishments for some offences and also provides for 
minimum prohibitions on driving that increase on  
second and subsequent offences.
Defining Street Racing 
Street racing is now defined in s.2 of the Criminal Code 
as “operating a motor vehicle in a race with at least one 
other motor vehicle on a street, road, highway or other 
public place.”
The New Offences
Section 249.3 creates an indictable offence to cause 
bodily harm while street racing:
s.249.4 Criminal Code
(1) Everyone commits an offence who, while street racing, operates 
a motor vehicle in a manner described in paragraph 249(1)(a).
(2) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(3) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1) and 
thereby causes bodily harm to another person is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding fourteen years.
(4) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1) and 
thereby causes the death of another person is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
               Street Racing Sentencing Grid
Offence Punishment (Jail) Punishment (Driving Prohibition)
Min Max Min Max
Criminal Negligence Cause Death while Street Racing
s.249.2 Criminal Code
none life 1st offence........1 yr
2nd offence.......life
life
Criminal Negligence CBH while Street Racing
s.249.3 Criminal Code
none 14 yrs 1st offence.........1 yr
2nd offence........2 yrs
3rd + offences....3 yrs
10 yrs
10 yrs
life
Dangerous Operation while Street Racing
s.249.4(2) Criminal Code
none Summarily=6 mos
Indictment=5 yrs
1st offence.........1 yr
2nd offence........2 yrs
3rd + offences....3 yrs
3 yrs
5 yrs
life
Dangerous Operation CBH while Street Racing
s.249.4(3) Criminal Code 
none 14 yrs 1st offence.........1 yr
2nd offence........2 yrs
3rd + offences....3 yrs
10 yrs
10 yrs
life
Dangerous Operation Cause Death while Street Racing
s.249.4(4) Criminal Code
none life 1st offence.........1 yr
2nd offence........life
10 yrs
“Bodily harm” is defined in s.2 of the Criminal Code as 
“any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the 
health of comfort of the person and that is more than 
merely transient or trifling in nature.”
www.10-8.ca
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GROUNDS FOR DETENTION LESS 
THAN ARREST
R. v. Aslam, 2006 BCCA 551
Two police officers driving a marked 
police car routinely ran the licence plate 
of a van travelling in the opposite 
direction. The van was registered to an 
Asian name living out of town, but the driver 
appeared to be East Indian. The police decided to do 
a licence and registration check, activated their 
emergency lights, and made a u-turn. The van made 
an erratic move to the curb and parked; the two 
occupants got out and walked away toward a lane. The 
officers cut them off, identified themselves as 
police, and asked the accused who owned the vehicle. 
He said he wanted to talk to his lawyer and appeared 
nervous and sweaty. 
The accused and his companion were detained while 
police conducted further investigation to determine 
whether the van was stolen. The following reasons 
were cited for the detention:
• The men were not Asian;
• They refused to identify the owner;
• The manner they parked the vehicle; and
• They were breathing heavy and sweating.
One of the officers went to the van, which was 
locked and looked inside. He saw the 
passenger door handle and ignition 
cylinder were damaged. He opined 
that the van was stolen. Both men 
were then arrested for possessing 
stolen property and patted down. In 
the accused’s pocket police found a 
key, which they wanted to use to 
open the door and look in the 
glovebox for information about the 
registered owner. As soon as the 
officer opened the door he detected 
an overwhelming odour of marihuana and concluded 
there was a large quantity of it in the van. He saw a 
duffle bag between the driver and passenger seats 
and opened it, finding packages of marihuana.
The men were re-arrested for possessing marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking and given their 
Charter warning. The accused again asked for a 
lawyer and did not give a statement. The police 
returned to the van, opened the rear hatch and 
found five more duffle bags of marihuana. In total 
202 lbs. of marihuana was seized from the van. The 
accused was subsequently convicted in British 
Columbia Supreme Court of possessing marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking. He then appealed 
his conviction to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing the detention, arrest, and search 
were unlawful because they lacked sufficient 
factual foundation. 
Justice Mackenzie, however, dismissed the 
accused’s appeal. Writing for the unanimous court, 
Justice Mackenzie first noted the test for 
investigative detention:
An investigat[ive] detention requires 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a detainee 
is criminally implicated in the activity under 
investigation. The threshold is lower than the 
reasonable and probable grounds required for 
an arrest.  The grounds for detention must be a 
reasonable suspicion determined objectively 
from the circumstances. [para. 6]
Here, the trial judge did not err in concluding the 
officers had reasonable grounds for an 
investigative detention. Further, once the officer 
saw the damaged door handle and ignition cylinder 
the officer had “reasonable and probable cause” to 
conclude the van was stolen, 
thereby justifying arrest. The pat 
down search that followed was 
“reasonable incident of that 
arrest.” The warrantless search of 
the van using the key was also 
lawful. “Here the intended search 
of the glove compartment was for 
the purpose of locating documents 
that would assist in determining 
ownership of the vehicle and 
relevant to the theft for which the 
[accused] was originally arrested,” said Justice 
Mackenzie. He continued:
Once the door was opened the officer testified 
that the smell of marihuana was overwhelming, 
consistent with the large quantity found by the 
subsequent search.   At that point there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
[accused]  for  a  drug  offence  and  it  was  not 
“An investigat[ive] detention 
requires reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a detainee is 
criminally implicated in the 
activity under investigation. The 
threshold is lower than the 
reasonable and probable 
grounds required for an arrest.”
www.10-8.ca8
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 necessary to formally arrest the [accused] for that 
offence in the circumstances before making the 
search…[references omitted, para 11]
The Court also rejected the accused’s assertion 
that the officers’ grounds for arrest dissipated 
once the vehicle key was found in his pocket. The 
officer testified that car thieves use master or 
filed keys to steal vehicles and finding the key did 
not cause him to reconsider the arrest. The trial 
judge’s conclusion that the officers continued to 
have reasonable and probable grounds for arrest 
from the time of initial arrest until the opening of 
the van door to determine ownership was sound. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
REASONABLE GROUNDS DOES 
NOT REQUIRE CORROBORATION 
OF CRIMINAL ASPECT OF TIP
R. v. Goodine, 2006 NBCA 109
Police received a Crime Stoppers tip 
that the accused had been travelling 
to Montreal every two to three weeks 
and was returning with contraband 
cigarettes. The tipster was untested and the tip 
was anonymous, however the following information 
was provided:
• he was 39 or 40 years of age; 
• he lived on the West River Road in Grand Falls, 
New Brunswick; 
• he worked for Carvell Goodine and Sons, his 
father’s business; 
• he was using a new Dodge pickup truck; 
• he had a girlfriend who operated a Dodge FX 
and provided the vehicle’s plate number;
• The tipster provided the accused’s personal 
phone number and said the accused had been 
involved in the purchase and distribution of 
contraband tobacco products for the previous 
six to 12 months, used either the Dodge pickup 
truck or his girlfriend’s Dodge FX to ferry the 
contraband tobacco products from Montreal to 
Grand Falls, and that the accused’s modus 
operandi was to deliver the contraband to 
locations selected by his customers. There was 
little traffic to and from his residence. The 
tipster also stated that the accused had 
returned from Montreal the previous day with 
contraband tobacco products.
The police were then able to confirm, by 
surveillance and other means, the accuracy of 
almost every “neutral” piece of information 
provided, including the accused’s place of 
residence, phone number, and age, his girlfriend’s 
identity and place of residence, and that the 
vehicles described were regularly parked at the 
accused’s residence. Their licence plate numbers 
and ownership were also verified. 
Over the next four months the tipster called three 
more times. Twice to report the accused had 
traveled to Montreal and had returned with a load 
of contraband tobacco. On the final occasion the 
tipster said the accused had gone to Montreal to 
pick up more tobacco products and would be 
returning later in the day.
At this point the police investigators believed they 
had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
accused. They set up surveillance at the Quebec-
New Brunswick border and waited to see him cross 
into New Brunswick. In the meantime, police called 
his mother’s house and asked for him. They were 
told he had gone to Montreal earlier that day and 
would be returning sometime before midnight. As 
midnight approached, police saw the accused’s 
vehicle on the Quebec side of the border heading 
for New Brunswick. 
The accused was followed and stopped as he 
entered Grand Falls. He was arrested for 
possession of contraband cigarettes and admitted 
their presence in the back of his truck, which was 
covered with a tarp. A warrant was subsequently 
obtained and 19 cases containing 50 cartons of 
cigarettes along with a plastic baggie holding 37 
cigarettes was seized. At trial in New Brunswick 
Provincial Court the accused was convicted of 
unlawfully possessing tobacco products under the 
Excise Act.
The accused then appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal arguing he was arbitrarily detained 
under s.9 of the Charter. In the accused’s view, he 
was arbitrarily detained because his arrest was 
www.10-8.ca
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unlawful for lack of reasonable grounds.  The 
tipster was untested and only “neutral” or 
“innocent” bits of the information had been 
corroborated. None of the “criminal” aspects had 
been corroborated by independent sources. 
Justice Drapeau, authoring the opinion of the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal, ruled that corroborated 
“criminal” aspects of a tip are not always required in 
assessing whether the police have reasonable 
grounds. He stated:
Once unpacked the case on appeal boils down to 
the following narrow question, one of first 
impression in this Court: must 
the allegation of criminal activity 
by an untested anonymous 
tipster always be corroborated 
through other independent 
investigative means before the 
police can lawfully act upon that 
allegation and proceed to arrest 
its target? In my view, an affirmative answer is 
not ordained, as a matter of law. There are 
cases where a trial judge could reasonably 
conclude that, on the totality of the 
circumstances, the arresting officers had the 
requisite grounds to act as they did even 
though the “criminal” aspect of the tip had not 
been corroborated in the manner suggested 
above. Such corroboration is certainly not 
required by law in cases where, like the present 
one, there is no suggestion of any improper 
motive on the tipster’s part and the 
corroborated “neutral” data are such that a 
reasonable and dispassionate observer would 
conclude the tipster is both closely acquainted 
with the target and, to some extent, privy to 
the criminal activity being reported. The case 
against a finding of unlawfulness is the more 
compelling where, as here, that observer would 
be at a loss to point to any justification – other 
than farfetched speculative possibilities - for 
the conclusion that the tipster’s allegation of 
criminal conduct is unreliable. [para. 2]
And further:
As I note in the introduction to these reasons, 
lack of corroboration of the “criminal” aspect 
of a tip by an untested anonymous source does 
not preclude a finding that an arrest based on 
that tip was lawful, at least where the following 
circumstances are in play: (1) there is no 
evidence that an improper motive underlies the 
tipster’s report; (2) the corroborated 
“neutral” data would lead a reasonable and 
dispassionate observer to infer that the 
tipster is both closely acquainted with the 
target and privy to the criminal activity being 
reported; and (3) that observer would be at a 
loss to point to any fact-based, as opposed to 
speculative, justification for the conclusion 
that the allegation of criminal conduct is 
unreliable. In my view, the issue for trial 
judges is always whether, having regard to the 
totality of the circumstances, sufficient 
grounds existed to lawfully carry out the 
arrest. In other words, there is no hard and 
fast rule; what is required is a 
case-specific determination 
that reflects an assessment 
of the totality of the 
circumstances apparent to the 
arresting officers at the time 
they took action. [para. 20]
In order for a warrantless 
arrest to be lawful there must be reasonable and 
probable grounds, or credibly based probability. 
The standard is not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or a prima facie case. Although a tip by itself 
is insufficient to provide reasonable grounds, a tip 
can provide the necessary grounds if its reliability 
is satisfactorily established. This assessment 
requires a “totality of circumstances” approach. 
Where information is provided by an informant, a 
variety of factors must be considered including:
• The degree of detail of the tip;
• The informant’s (tipster’s) source of 
knowledge; and
• Indicia of the informer’s reliability (such as 
past performance or confirmation from 
other investigative sources). 
In holding that the trial judge did not err in his 
assessment of whether the accused’s arrest was 
based on reasonable and probable grounds, Justice 
Drapeau wrote:
The trial judge did not commit an error of law 
in rejecting the proposition that the tip upon 
which the officers relied to arrest [the 
accused] could not provide the requisite 
reasonable and probable grounds because its 
“criminal” aspect had not been independently 
corroborated. Corroboration of that nature 
was not necessary because: (1) there is not a 
“...lack of corroboration of the 
‘criminal’ aspect of a tip by an 
untested anonymous source does 
not preclude a finding that an arrest 
based on that tip was lawful...”
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shred of evidence that the tipster was 
actuated by an improper motive; (2) the 
corroborated “neutral” data, particularly the 
same-day trip to Montreal and back on August 
28, are such that one is driven to the conclusion 
that the tipster was closely acquainted with 
[the accused] and, to a significant extent, privy 
to the criminal activity being reported; and (3) 
no one can point to any pre-arrest statement by 
the tipster that might cast doubt on his or her 
reliability. This case is entirely distinguishable 
on its facts from R. v. Cormier (R.D.) (1995), 
166 N.B.R. (2d) 5… where the arresting 
officers acted upon “nothing more than a 
hunch” …[para. 30]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ENTRY TO PROTECT LIFE VALID 
AFTER NEIGHBOUR REPORTS 
GUNSHOTS 
R. v. Hill, 2006 BCCA 530
Police received a 911 call from one of 
the accused’s neighbours reporting 
that she heard a gunshot coming from 
his property situated on a five acre 
parcel. Police were dispatched and advised to 
proceed with caution. Upon arriving near the 
property, police were approached by the 
complainant’s husband who also said he heard the 
shot and believed it came from the accused’s house. 
Shortly thereafter, officers heard two more 
gunshots they believed came from the area of the 
accused’s house. The complainant was contacted by 
police and said she heard these two other shots as 
well and believed they came from the accused’s 
house. 
A member of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) 
became involved in discussions on how best to 
approach the situation. A decision was made by 
police to contact the accused and clear his home, 
believing they had a public duty to search the house 
to ensure no one had been injured or killed. Wearing 
bullet proof vests, officer managed to get the 
accused to exit his house by using a siren and loud 
hailer. The police told the accused why they were 
there and he suggested the shots may have come 
from a neighbouring property or from a container 
near the house that had a firecracker device in it. 
The police did not accept these explanations and 
after another occupant left the house police  
cleared it. In a search that lasted six minutes, 
police discovered 105 lbs. of marihuana in a small 
room in the basement. These drugs were 
subsequently seized under a warrant. 
At trial in the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
the accused was convicted of possessing marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking. Although the search 
of the home was without a warrant and therefore 
prima facie unreasonable, the judge found the 
common law duties of the police permit a 
warrantless entry to preserve the peace, prevent 
crime, and protect life and property.  These duties, 
the judge ruled, authorized the police to respond to 
exigencies in a manner required by the emergency. 
Here, the police believed the 911 call was legitimate, 
it was supported by objective criteria, the 
complainant had no ulterior motive in reporting the 
gunshots, and there was nothing to suggest the 
shots did not come from the residence. As well, the 
officers collectively viewed entry as necessary, the 
accused’s inconsistent explanations for the sounds 
added to police concern, and the purpose of entry 
was not to investigate a crime but to secure the life 
and safety of anyone in harm’s way. The accused 
received 30 months in prison, a $50,000 fine and 
was prohibited from possessing weapons. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing the warrantless search of his 
home was unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter. In 
his view, the circumstances did not provide a 
reasonable belief at the time of entry that there 
was a person in the house who needed emergency aid 
and assistance. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that the circumstances must be viewed 
as a whole, rather than on a piecemeal basis. 
Justice Prowse, for the unanimous British Columbia 
Court of Appeal, upheld the accused’s conviction. 
Although the police could not pinpoint the location 
of the shots they heard, they were nonetheless still 
acting on the report by the complainant, confirmed 
by her husband, that the gunshots were connected 
to the accused’s residence. The police were 
concerned enough that they contacted ERT and 
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consulted amongst themselves numerous times 
before finally approaching the residence. The 
officers honestly believed they needed to search 
the house to properly investigate the complaint and 
ensure no one inside was in harm’s way. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
STOP OF VEHICLE LEAVING BAR 
LATE AT NIGHT NOT 
ARBITRARY
R. v. Schell, 2006 SKCA 128
A police officer parked his police car 
with its park lights on about half a 
block away from the front entrance 
of a local liquor establishment in a 
small town in the early morning hours. His intentions 
were to act as a deterrent and also stop every 
vehicle leaving the area to check driver sobriety. 
After seeing two men leave the bar and walk around 
the corner, the officer saw a truck, which he had 
noted earlier parked on a side street near the bar, 
drive down the street. He followed the truck a few 
blocks and stopped the vehicle, asking for a driver’s 
licence and vehicle registration. Noting the 
accused’s breath smelled of alcohol, a roadside test 
was administered and he failed. He was taken to the 
police station and two breathalyser samples over 
the legal limit were obtained.  
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the judge 
ruled the accused had been arbitrarily detained by 
the police contrary to s.9 of the Charter because 
there was no articulable cause to stop him. The only 
reason the police stopped the vehicle was because 
it was being driven away from the immediate area of 
the bar where it had been parked. The certificate 
of analysis was excluded under s.24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted. An appeal by Crown to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench was 
unsuccessful. 
The Crown then appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal arguing the officer had reasonable 
grounds (or articulable cause) to detain the 
accused. In the Crown’s view, a patrol officer’s 
decision to stop as many vehicles as possible leaving 
a local bar does not make the stop arbitrary. The 
accused, on the other hand, submitted there was no 
cause for suspicion presented at trial that would 
justify detention . 
Justice Lane, writing the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal’s opinion, allowed the Crown’s appeal. The 
detention took place in a smaller community, late on 
a Friday night about bar close time. The officer 
observed the accused walk from the bar and then a 
vehicle seen parked nearby leave the immediate 
area. The stop was not random and the officer had 
reasonable grounds to detain. Justice Lane stated:
The officer had objective grounds for 
detaining the [accused] in the circumstances of 
this case as previously stated.   It was late at 
night, around the time the bar was to close, and 
the patrons were leaving. He saw the [accused] 
leave the bar, and shortly thereafter saw a 
vehicle he had previously identified leave the 
immediate vicinity of the bar and proceed down 
the street.  The apprehension took place close 
to the bar. [para. 19]
There was no s.9 Charter breach and the 
certificate of analysis was admissible. Since the 
essential elements of the offence were admitted, a 
conviction on an over 80mg% charge was entered 
and the matter remitted back to Provincial Court 
for sentencing.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
JP ENTITLED TO DRAW 
REASONABLE INFERENCES 
FROM INFORMATION 
R. v. Durling, 2006 NSCA 124
Police received an anonymous Crime 
Stoppers tip reporting that the 
accused was growing marihuana in the 
basement of the white house she was 
renting. The tipster stated there were huge lights 
plugged into outlets similar to those used for stoves 
and dryers. The accused’s phone number and place 
of work was also provided. 
The police followed up on the tip. Investigators 
confirmed the phone number belonged to the 
accused at the address provided. The house was 
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other words, it is not the role of the reviewing 
judge to substitute their view of the evidence for 
that of the issuing judge. In this case, the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal ruled the warrant was 
quashed in error. 
The trial judge considered that there was a lack of 
corroboration respecting the illegal aspects of the 
tip while many of the legal details of the tip (ie. 
name, address, place of employment) were 
corroborated. The FLIR results and covered window 
observations were weighed by the trial judge and he 
concluded the police had only a strong suspicion, not 
credibly based probability required for a warrant. 
The trial judge also wrongfully suggested the 
justice of the peace could only draw proper 
inferences from the information as opposed to 
reasonable inferences. A justice of the peace is 
entitled to draw their own inferences as long as 
those inferences are reasonable. Since the trial 
judge applied the wrong standard of review he 
erred in law. Thus the Court of Appeal was required 
to apply the proper test. In this case, Chief Justice 
MacDonald found the warrant valid. He stated:
Thus, based on the information provided in this 
case, as supplemented in the voir dire, I ask 
whether the JP could have issued the warrant?  
For the following reasons, I would say that she 
could:
-The tipster was specific as to the 
respondent's identity, her phone number, her 
employment, the location of her residence, and 
the fact that the premises were leased. This 
was all corroborated by the police. 
- As revealed in the voir dire, the tipster 
reported to have personal knowledge as opposed 
to reporting hearsay.
- The FLIR results were probative not only in 
relation to other nearby dwellings, they also 
confirmed that the increased heat was coming 
from the basement. This corroborates the 
tipster's report.
- The covered basement windows further 
corroborated the alleged illegal activity. [para. 
30]
The search was lawful, there was no breach of s.8, 
and the evidence was admissible. The Crown’s appeal 
was allowed and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
verified as rental property and a drive-by of the 
address revealed a white single story bungalow with 
a brick chimney and a small wine coloured vehicle 
parked near the rear door. When police drove by 
the mall where it was reported the accused worked, 
they saw a vehicle similar to the wine coloured car 
parked. The licence plate was checked and the 
vehicle was registered to the accused, but at a 
different address. Police also called the accused’s 
workplace and she answered the phone. The police 
drove by the residence several more times and saw 
lights on and cars in the driveway, but nothing of 
any consequence. 
A second Crime Stoppers report was received from 
the tipster again confirming the existence of the 
grow operation and that about 150 plants would be 
soon harvested. A hand held FLIR was used on the 
residence and an increased level of heat was 
detected coming from the basement compared to 
the remainder of the home. This was consistent 
with the use of high powered lights used at a grow 
operation and with them being in the basement. The 
FLIR was also aimed at several neighbouring 
residences and no similar elevated heat levels were 
detected. 
The investigators also noted the basement windows 
were covered with a material designed to prevent 
light from being observed and obtained a warrant 
from a justice of the peace to search the house and 
found evidence confirming the grow operation. The 
accused was subsequently charged with producing 
marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the judge 
quashed the warrant. In his view there was 
insufficient information upon which to base the 
warrant. The search was therefore warrantless and 
a breach of the accused’s Charter rights. The 
evidence was excluded and the accused was 
acquitted. The Crown then appealed to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal arguing the justice of the 
peace had enough evidence to justify the warrant. 
The legal test for determining whether a judge 
properly issued a search warrant is not whether the 
reviewing judge would have issued it, but rather 
whether the issuing judge could have issued it. In 
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reasonable and probable grounds for the breath 
demand. In a 2:1 majority, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal first noted that “a finding that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds requires a finding 
that the officer subjectively have an honest belief 
that the suspect has committed the offence and 
objectively there must exist reasonable grounds for 
this belief” (internal quotations omitted). 
Subjectively, in this case, the officer’s “opinion” the 
accused was impaired was no different that an 
honest belief he was impaired.  Objectively, the 
officer had a combination of facts that the accused 
was impaired that went beyond alcohol consumption 
alone. Even without evidence of unusual driving the 
officer was entitled to consider the accident that, 
with no other apparent cause, suggested alcohol 
consumption had impaired the driver’s conduct .  
Justice Slatter, in dissent, would have allowed the 
appeal, set aside the convictions and ordered new 
trials. In his view, the trial judge applied the wrong 
legal test in deciding whether the officer had 
objective reasonable and probable grounds.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
REQUIRES SUBJECTIVE BELIEF 
BASED ON OBJECTIVE 
CRITERIA
R. v. Rhyason, 2006 ABCA 367
The accused was driving a vehicle 
when he struck and killed a pedestrian 
crossing the street in a marked, lit 
crosswalk at a controlled intersection. 
The attending officer noted the accused had 
bloodshot eyes, an unusually blank stare, possibly 
from shock, and he blinked unusually slow. He was 
also shaking and had alcohol on his breath. He 
admitted to being the driver and was polite, but 
upset, showed no balance or speech problems, and 
did not take long to answer questions. The officer 
arrested him for impaired driving causing death 
after forming the “opinion” he had consumed enough 
alcohol to impair his driving. Breath samples were 
subsequently taken.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused argued the officer did not have the 
requisite reasonable and probable grounds needed 
to demand a sample of his breath under s.254(3) of 
the Criminal Code. In his view, the results of the 
breath sample should have been excluded. The 
judge disagreed and concluded that the officer did 
have the required grounds, although borderline. 
Although the trial judge noted there were no 
obvious sign of impairment and the signs that were 
evident were equally consistent with emotional 
distress, the officer did have a deceased 
pedestrian, an admitted driver with a smell of 
alcohol on his breath, and minor evidence consistent 
with alcohol consumption. 
Furthermore, the accident itself was a valid 
component of the officer’s grounds even though 
there was no slurring, no staggering, and no unusual 
driving before the accident. The breathalyser 
certificate was admissible and the accused was 
convicted of over 80mg% and impaired driving 
causing death. 
The accused then appealed the trial judge’s ruling 
to the Alberta Court of Appeal again submitting, 
among other issues, that the officer did not have 
Subjective 
belief
Objective 
basis
Reasonable 
Grounds
“In summary then...an arresting officer 
must subjectively have reasonable and 
probable grounds on which to base the 
arrest.  Those grounds must, in addition, 
be justifiable from an objective point of 
view.  That is to say, a reasonable 
person placed in the position of the 
officer must be able to conclude that 
there were indeed reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest.”  
Justice Cory
R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241
www.10-8.ca14
Volume 7 Issue 1
January/February 2007
Assault Police Offences: 1996-2005 
760 750
767
807
1,011
830
834
878
922
934
700
750
800
850
900
950
1000
1050
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year
Nu
m
be
r 
o
f O
ffe
n
ce
s
ASSAULTS AGAINST 
B.C. POLICE RISE
Although the Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics recently reported Canada’s overall crime 
rate dropped by 5% including a 2.2% reduction in 
violent crime, British Columbia’s Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General reports 
that assaults against the police are on 
the rise . The number of offences for 
assaulting police 
have risen 
from a 10 
year low of 750 in 
1997 to a 10 year 
high of 1,011 in 
2005. That is an 
increase of nearly 35%. Of the 1,011 
reported offences in 2005, 916 were 
cleared, representing a clearance rate 
of almost 91%. There were 712 persons 
charged, including 643 adults and 69 youths. 
Perhaps most disturbing, is that the number of 
youths charged with assaulting a police officer has 
risen over 43%; from 48 in 1996 to 69 in 2005.
The rate of assaults against British Columbia police 
in 2005 was 13.5 per 100 police officers. This is 
higher than the U.S. average rate of assaults at 
11.9 per 100 sworn officers as reported by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2005). 
The rate of weapons 
possession offences has 
also risen considerably. 
In 1999 there were 1,695 
reported weapons possession 
offences. By 2005 that total 
had more than doubled to 
3,398. 
The number of offences of 
obstructing police 
have also 
increased.  
In 2000 there 
were a reported 
1,226 obstruct 
police offences. 
That total had risen to 1,552 
offences in 2005; an increase of 
more than 26%.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200320022001 2004 2005
 35%
Weapons 
Possession
 100%
Obstruct
Police
 26%
Assault 
Police
Obstruct Police Offences
Year Number of Offences Number of Officers
2000 1,226 6,708
2001 1,330 6,895
2002 1,421 6,958
2003 1,384 7,106
2004 1,524 7,193
2005 1,552 7,469
Source: Police and Crime, Summary Statistics, 1996-
2005, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 
Years 2000-2005, Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
Persons Charged Assault Police
Source: Police and Crime, Summary Statistics, 1996-2005, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
2005
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test was performed. The accused failed and a 
breathalyser demand was given. He subsequently 
provided samples over 80mg%.
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court on a 
charge of over 80mg% the trial judge found the 
accused had been arbitrarily detained contrary to 
s.9 of the Charter. She 
held the police were 
engaged in preventative 
policing and had stopped 
the accused to rule out 
suspicious behaviour. The certificate of analysis 
was excluded and the accused was acquitted.
The Crown unsuccessfully appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. In the 
appeal judge’s view there was no authority to stop 
the accused under s.40(8) of Saskatchewan’s 
Highway Traffic Act (HTA) because the detention 
was not related to highway safety reasons. Nor was 
there an articulable cause, or reasonable grounds, 
to detain him for an offence. The police officers 
were not involved in any criminal investigation nor 
did they have reason to believe he had committed or 
was engaged in an ongoing offence. The arbitrary 
detention ruling was upheld. 
The Crown then appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal arguing that there were reasonable 
grounds to detain the accused or, in the alternative, 
that the police had the authority to stop a motor 
vehicle under s.40(8) of the HTA to rule out 
suspicious behaviour. 
Motor Vehicle Legislation 
Section 40(8) of the HTA reads:
This section allows the police to randomly stop a 
motorist. A stop of this nature is arbitrary under 
s.9 of the Charter but saved by s.1 if the purpose of 
the stop is related to highway traffic matters. It 
does not, however, allow the police to stop any 
PAST STANDARD PRACTICE 
PROVES FACT
R. v. Cunningham, 2006 ABCA 345
A police officer completed a notice of 
intention to produce a certificate of 
analysis of breath samples. The 
document was a “self-carbonizing” 
form but the affidavit of service was not properly 
sworn. At trial the officer could not recall 
comparing the copies, but testified it was his 
standard practice to do so. The trial judge found 
the officer’s standard practice met the evidentiary 
burden placed on the crown to prove service beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The accused was convicted, but 
appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal.
In a memorandum of judgment the Alberta Court of 
Appeal dismissed the accused’s appeal. Whether or 
not the Crown can rely on an officer’s past practice 
where the affidavit of service is defective and the 
officer cannot specifically recall the events will be 
assessed on a case by case basis. Here, the officer’s 
standard practice met the Crown’s obligation of 
proving service of the Notice of Intention. Even 
though it would have been preferable for the Crown 
to have adduced more evidence to further support 
the reliability of the officer’s evidence, such as how 
long and how often the officer used this standard 
practice and how long the officer had been a police 
officer, the trial judge weighed appropriate factors 
and looked for circumstantial guarantees of 
reliability of standard practice. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
TRAFFIC LEGISLATION DOES 
NOT CREATE POWER TO 
DETAIN FOR INVESTIGATION
R. v. Houben, 2006 SKCA 129
Two police officers on routine patrol in 
a residential neighbourhood at about 
2:30 am stopped a pick-up truck they 
saw on three previous occasions driving 
in different directions. The accused was asked for 
his driver’s licence and registration. It was apparent 
he had consumed alcohol and a roadside screening 
s.9 Charter
Everyone has the right 
not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned.
s.40(8) Highway Traffic Act 
A peace officer who:
(a) is readily identifiable as a peace officer; and
(b) is in the lawful execution of his or her duties and 
responsibilities;
may require the person in charge of or operating a motor vehicle 
to stop that vehicle.
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Reasonable Grounds to Detain
Under the common law the police may detain a 
person for investigative purposes if there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect the person is 
connected to a particular crime and the detention 
is necessary. In this case, however, the trial judge 
found the police had no criminal activity in mind. 
They were not investigating any crime in the 
neighbourhood. Nor was the neighbourhood known 
as a high crime area or one frequented by 
prostitutes. The officers were acting on hunches, 
mere suspicion, or as the officers called it 
“preventative policing.” The requirements of 
reasonable grounds to detain, or articulable 
cause, requires something more than a hunch, 
intuition, or curiosity. Therefore, the stop could 
not be justified as an investigative detention. 
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
I believe that people should strive for the top of 
their game, not the top of the organization. Each of 
us should work to reach our potential, not 
necessarily the corner office. Sometimes you can 
make the greatest impact from somewhere other 
than first place. - John C. Maxwell
vehicle at any time at any place without a reason 
legitimately connected to highway safety.  Justice 
Jackson wrote:
…Even though a detention may be arbitrary, if 
a police officer is acting pursuant to s. 40(8) of 
The Highway Traffic Act any stop effected by 
the officer is a justifiable infringement of the 
individual’s rights under s. 1 of the Charter.
While the police officer acting under s. 40(8) 
need not have “reasonable grounds to detain,” 
it must be the police officer’s 
intention to be proceeding to 
satisfy the aims of that statute 
as articulated in such authorities 
as Mellenthin.  The police officer 
need not say expressly to himself 
or herself that he or she is 
proceeding to exercise the 
authority under s. 40(8), or 
testify to this express effect, 
but the trier of fact must be able to conclude 
on the basis of the evidence that the police 
officer was checking for "sobriety, licences, 
ownership, insurance and the mechanical 
fitness of cars." In sum, s. 40(8) cannot be used 
to create a general power of detention for 
investigative purposes.
………
If a police officer has a suspicion that a driver 
is involved in criminal activity, unrelated to 
traffic enforcement, such that he or she would 
like to stop a motor vehicle, the suspicion must 
meet the test in Mann.
If the law were otherwise and a police officer 
could stop a motor vehicle for a mere suspicion 
short of "reasonable grounds to detain," and 
then say that he or she had been exercising the 
power under s. 40(8) simply because that power 
exists, all stops could become those to check 
out suspicious activity.  The police officer could 
stop anyone at any time on the basis of 
suspicion.   At least in the context of motor 
vehicle stops, there would be no reason to have 
created a power to stop related to "reasonable 
grounds to detain." [paras. 64-68]
Here, the police officers testified they were not 
concerned with highway traffic matters when they 
made their stop. Thus, the stop could not be 
justified under s.40(8). 
“In sum, s. 40(8) 
cannot be used to 
create a general 
power of detention 
for investigative 
purposes.”
 “To summarize...police officers may detain 
an individual for investigative purposes if 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect in 
all the circumstances that the individual is 
connected to a particular crime and that 
such a detention is necessary.  In addition, 
where a police officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that his or her safety or 
that of others is at risk, the officer may 
engage in a protective pat-down search of 
the detained individual.  Both the detention 
and the pat-down search must be conducted 
in a reasonable manner.” 
Justice Iacobucci
R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52
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SKATEBOARDER IS A 
‘PEDESTRIAN’
R. v. Atchison, 2006 ABCA 258
The accused was charged under s.41(1) 
of Alberta’s Use of Highway and Rules 
of the Road 
Regulation for 
failing to yield to a 
pedestrian in a cross-walk 
after she struck a person 
with her vehicle while they were crossing the street 
on their skateboard. At the initial hearing the 
traffic commissioner determined that the 
skateboarder was not a 
pedestrian under Alberta’s 
Traffic Safety Act (TSA) 
and dismissed the case.
The Crown successfully 
appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench 
and the traffic 
commissioner’s decision 
was overturned. The judge ruled that a pedestrian 
under the TSA included a person on a skateboard or 
similar device and the matter was sent back for 
trial. 
The accused then appealed the judge’s reversal of 
the traffic commissioner’s decision to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal. Using the rules of statutory 
interpretation, Justice Picard, delivering the 
judgment for the court, upheld the ruling that a 
skateboarder was a pedestrian. He 
found that a skateboard, although 
not specifically covered in the TSA 
and only mentioned twice in the act 
and the regulation, was clearly not a 
“vehicle” nor a “mobility aid”. A 
“pedestrian”, on the other hand, 
could include a person on a 
skateboard. Justice Picard stated: 
The scheme and object of the TSA is to promote 
the safety of persons using roadways by imposing 
various requirements and rules such as those set 
out in Division 9 of the Regulation. This Division 
establishes rules for yielding the right of way to 
other vehicles and pedestrians, but does not 
specifically refer to persons on skateboards or 
similar devices. Neither are there rules anywhere 
else in the TSA or Regulation that deal with 
yielding to persons on skateboards and the many 
other similar devices that are commonly used on 
modern roadways. Thus, there is a distinct gap in 
the legislation, unless persons on such devices can 
be considered pedestrians.
If persons on 
skateboards and 
similar devices are 
not considered 
pedestrians for 
purposes of the TSA, the driver of a vehicle 
striking such a person could never be charged 
with an offence; similarly, if two persons were 
struck, one walking and one travelling on a 
skateboard or similar device, the driver could 
only be charged with striking the person who was 
walking. As pointed 
out by the summary 
conviction appeal 
justice, this is an 
absurd result and 
cannot have been the 
intention of the 
Legislature.
While most dictionary 
definitions of pedestrian generally refer to a 
person travelling on foot, this Court has 
previously noted that the definition of pedestrian 
in Black’ s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. includes 
persons on roller skates, ice skates, stilts or 
crutches…. Persons travelling with the aid of 
these types of devices can still be considered to 
be travelling on foot, as opposed to in a vehicle, 
and it is our view that the ordinary and 
grammatical meaning of the word 
“pedestrian” is broad enough to encompass 
persons travelling on skateboards or 
similar devices.
Thus, when the ordinary and grammatical 
meaning of the word “pedestrian” is 
considered in light of the object and 
scheme of the TSA and the intention of 
the Legislature, it is our view that it must 
include persons on skateboards and similar 
devices. [references omitted, paras. 9-12]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and the case 
was remitted back for trial. 
Complete case available at albertacourts.ab.ca
s.41(1) Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation  
A person driving a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a 
pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk.
s.1(1)(gg) Traffic Safety Act
“pedestrian” means
(i)  a person on foot, or
(ii) a person in or on a 
mobility aid,
and includes those persons 
designated by regulation as 
pedestrians.
s.1(1)(v) Traffic Safety Act
“mobility aid” means a 
device used to facilitate 
the transport, in a normal 
seated orientation, of a 
person with a physical 
disability.
s.1(1)(ww) Traffic Safety Act
“vehicle”, other than in Part 6, 
means a device in, on or by 
which a person or thing may be 
transported or drawn on a 
highway and includes a 
combination of vehicles but 
does not include a mobility aid.
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Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. The appeal judge 
found the “straddle evidence”—opinion evidence 
that the accused’s BAC may have been over or under 
the legal limit at the time—speculative or 
conjecture.  In his view, evidence to the contrary 
under s.258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code required 
evidence eliminating a scenario that the accused’s 
BAC could be over 80mg% at the time of driving. 
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal. 
There are two standard presumptions found in the 
Criminal Code relating to breathalyser cases:
1. presumption of accuracy—under s.258(1)(g) 
(and s.25 of the Interpretation Act) the 
certificate of analysis showing the readings 
of breath samples is presumed to accurately 
reflect the BAC when the accused blew into 
the instrument.
2. presumption of identity—under s.258(1)(c) 
the accused’s BAC at the time of testing is 
the same level as at the time of driving. As 
well, under s.258(1)(d.1), if the accused’s 
BAC is over 80mg% reading at the time of 
testing it is presumed it exceeded 80mg% 
at time of driving. Both these presumptions 
of identity require the sample be taken 
within two hours of the time of driving or 
care and control.
In order to rebut these presumptions the accused 
must raise a reasonable doubt by showing evidence 
to the contrary. It is not enough for an accused to 
demonstrate that their BAC was different than 
what was recorded by the instrument. Rather, they 
must point to or adduce evidence tending to show 
NOT ENOUGH TO SHOW BAC 
DIFFERENT TO REBUT 
PRESUMPTION
R. v. MacDonald, 2006 ABCA 177
The accused was stopped in a check 
stop and failed a roadside screening 
test. He subsequently provided two 
breath tests with readings of 146 
mg% and was charged with impaired driving and 
operating a vehicle having a blood alcohol content 
(BAC) over 80mg%. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused said 
he had consumed six cans of beer evenly spaced 
over a period of three and a half hours and finished 
his last beer five minutes before being stopped by 
police. He called an expert in the absorption and 
elimination of alcohol and the effects of alcohol on 
the human body. The expert testified he tested the 
accused’s elimination rate of alcohol (using vodka) 
and determined it to be 18.5 mg% per hour. As a 
result of his tests, the expert stated that the 
accused would have had to drink nine and half beers 
to get the readings he did. If he did have only six 
beer his BAC at the time of driving would have been 
71mg%. Even assuming that the accused’s 
elimination rate was average, between 10mg% and 
20mg%, his BAC would be between 64mg%-109mg%. 
And accounting for the unabsorbed beer he had 
drank five minutes before the stop, his BAC could 
have been between 56mg%-101mg%.
The trial judge convicted the accused of over 
80mg% but acquitted him of the impaired driving 
charge. The accused unsuccessfully appealed to the 
2 hours
Time of Driving Time of Test
• BAC at time of driving same as BAC at time of test (s.258(1)(c) CC)
• if BAC > 80mg% at time of test, then BAC at time of driving >80mg% (s.258(1)(d.1) CC)
Presumption of Identity
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cannot be discredited because of speculation 
that another average person may more quickly 
eliminate and thereby obtain a lesser reading. 
On the contrary, where the range put forward 
by the expert evidence discloses that the 
breathalyzer could properly register a reading 
in excess of 80 mg for the average person, then 
such evidence is confirmatory of a test result 
disclosing an alcohol level in excess of the legal 
limit. [paras. 58-59]
And further:
Here, it is the introduction of the range of 
possible blood alcohol levels based upon 
population averages, without evidence of where 
[the accused] fits within that range, that leads 
to the speculation in this case. [para. 62]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
STRAIGHT SHOOTIN’ 
FROM THE JUDGE
“Let’s get the record straight. 
• Do I view the Charter as a weed whose growth 
should be stunted? – Not on your life. 
• Do I have a problem with counsel who use the 
Charter to preserve and protect the rights of 
individuals and minority groups from state 
excesses? – Absolutely not. 
• Do I have a problem with counsel who use the 
Charter to promote and advance the cause of 
justice? – Absolutely not. 
Now ask me –
• Do I have a problem with counsel who trivialize and 
demean the Charter and who use it, not as a means 
of promoting justice, but as a means of delaying 
and in some cases obstructing it? – You bet I do. 
• Do I have a problem with counsel who clog the 
courts and tax an already overburdened justice 
system by bringing Charter and other applications 
that are baseless? – Absolutely. 
• Does it bother me that the antics of these same 
counsel are depriving worthy litigants from being 
able to access the courts in a timely fashion? – 
Absolutely. 
• Does it bother me that these same counsel are 
pilfering precious legal aid funds at the expense of 
needy litigants with legitimate causes? – 
Absolutely. 
their BAC was under 80mg%. Justice O’Brien, 
writing the opinion of the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
held:
…In order to rebut them, both presumptions 
require evidence tending to show that the 
concentration of alcohol in the blood did not 
exceed the legal limit of 80 mg, at the time of 
the test in the case of the presumption of 
accuracy and at the time of the driving in the 
case of the presumption of identity. [para. 34]
In this case the expert only measured the accused’s 
elimination rate. He did not measure his absorption 
rate nor did he attempt to simulate the same 
conditions at the time of driving. The quantity of 
alcohol, pattern of drinking, food consumption and  
type of drink (vodka versus beer) were different  
when used to calculate elimination rates. Nor were 
the ranges drawn from the general population 
acceptable. There was no evidence that the accused 
was absorbing and eliminating on the date of the 
offence within the range of the general population. 
Similarly, the expert’s evidence did not tend to 
show that the accused’ s BAC did not exceed 
80mg%. It showed a range of BAC levels, some over 
the legal limit and some under it. Justice O’brien 
wrote:
The offence created by s. 253(b) is not the 
quantity of alcohol consumed, but rather is the 
consumption resulting in an alcohol 
concentration exceeding 80 mg in 100 ml. The 
section applies equally to slow absorbers and 
eliminators and to fast absorbers and 
eliminators. In my view, the presumptions are 
legislated to avoid arguments based upon 
whether an accused is a fast or slow absorber 
and eliminator and the presumption of accuracy 
is not rebutted by demonstrating a range of 
possible alcohol levels, giving rise to conjecture 
as to whether or not the blood alcohol content 
was within the legal limit at the material time. 
Conjecture does not tend to show anything. 
Something more is needed to rebut the 
statutory presumption of the accuracy of the 
breathalyzer.
This is not a matter of denying [the accused] 
the benefit of reasonable doubt based upon 
evidence that might be true. This is a matter of 
statutory presumptions and the evidentiary 
basis required to displace them. The test result 
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• Am I going to give up on my fight against those 
who would abuse our criminal justice system and 
make a mockery of it? – Never. 
And let there be no doubt about it. The problems of 
which I speak are not, as an assistant professor at 
Osgoode Law School recently wrote, simply a product 
of “poor judgment by many criminal defence counsel on 
what Charter issues are worth litigating, as well as a 
plodding and prolix approach by some in advancing 
these claims”.
Unfortunately, the professor was not present when a 
distinguished member of the defence bar said to 
me...“Judge, you only have a problem with long criminal 
trials because you are on a fixed salary”.
The message – if you were making $500 or $600 an 
hour and $5,000 or $6,000 a day in court, you wouldn’t 
be complaining about long trials. You’d want them to go 
on forever!
And lets not kid ourselves. It doesn’t have to be 
$5,000 or $6,000 a day. Many would be happy with 
$2,000 or $3,000 or even a $1,000. And for those who 
think that way, the Charter is like a gift from heaven. 
It is the godsend of all godsends.”
Source: Remarks to the Justice Summit-2006, Justice Michael Moldaver, 
Ontario Court of Appeal Justice, “The State of the Criminal Justice System in 
2006: An Appellate Judge’s Perspective”
TIME OF ACCIDENT REQUIRES 
REASONABLE GROUNDS
R. v. Searle, 2006 NBCA 118
A police officer was dispatched to the 
scene of a two vehicle accident. The 
officer discovered one of the vehicles 
unoccupied while 
another officer dealt with the other 
driver. The officer subsequently 
located the other driver (the 
accused) and had him sit in the rear 
of the police car.  The officer noted 
physical signs of impairment and 
formed the opinion the accused had 
operated a motor vehicle while 
impaired by alcohol. A demand for 
breath samples was given and the 
accused was advised of his rights to counsel. At the 
police station the accused spoke to duty counsel and 
two breath samples were subsequently taken. 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of over 80mg% and the 
impaired charge was stayed. Although the Crown did 
not ask and the officer did not directly testify to 
his knowledge about when the accident happened, 
the trial judge ruled the officer could infer from 
the circumstances that he had knowledge the 
accident occurred moments before he was 
dispatched, which would bring the officer’s demand 
within the three hour period required by s.254(3) 
of the Criminal Code.
The accused’s appeal to the New Brunswick Court of 
Queen’s Bench was unsuccessful. The accused again 
appealed, this time to the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the trial 
judge misapplied the test for determining whether 
the officer had reasonable and probable grounds 
required under s.254(3). 
Justice Larlee, writing the opinion of the court, 
concluded that the officer did not have the 
necessary reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe the accused had committed the alcohol 
related driving offence within the preceding three 
hours as the legislation required. She stated:
In order to make a demand for a breath sample, 
a police officer must strictly comply with the 
requirements of s. 254(3) of the Code. In 
particular, the officer may make a demand if he 
or she believes on reasonable and probable 
grounds that a person is committing, or at any 
time within the preceding three hours has 
committed, as a result of the consumption of 
alcohol, an offence under s. 253 of the Code.
In Bernshaw, the Supreme Court 
concluded that to strictly 
comply with the requirements of 
s. 254(3), the police officer has 
to subjectively have an honest 
belief that the person who has 
allegedly committed the offence 
must have done so within the 
preceding three hours. 
Furthermore there must 
objectively be reasonable 
grounds for this belief...
To be clear the issue is not whether the 
accident did in fact occur in the last three 
hours prior to the demand being made, but 
rather whether the police officer, on 
“...the issue is not whether 
the accident did in fact occur 
in the last three hours prior 
to the demand being made, 
but rather whether the police 
officer, on reasonable and 
probable grounds, believed 
that to be the case.”
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YOUNG PERSON 
EXPLANATION NEED ONLY 
BE CLEAR
R. v. L.T.H., 2006 NSCA 409
The accused, a 15 year old youth, was 
arrested by Cole Harbour RCMP for 
dangerous driving following a car 
chase. He was advised of his rights and 
said he did not want to speak to a lawyer. About two 
hours later a police officer from the Halifax 
Regional Police Service took custody of the accused 
and arrested him for theft, possession of property 
obtained by crime, failing to stop for police, and 
dangerous driving. He was read his rights, given the 
police caution, and told he had the right to speak 
with an adult. He said he understood. Eleven hours 
later he was taken to an interview room where a 
detective went through a young offender statement 
form. This was all videotaped. The accused said he 
did not want to speak to a lawyer, parent, or adult 
and he initialed and signed the form. He was then 
interviewed and provided an inculpatory statement. 
At trial in Nova Scotia Youth Justice Court the 
judge said the Crown had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a statement made by a young 
person to a person in authority met the 
requirements of s.146 of the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act (YCJA). She found the statement was 
voluntary—not induced by threats, promises, 
oppression, or trickery. However, she was not 
satisfied the accused had fully understood his 
rights before giving his statement. 
In her view, answering “Yes” to “Do you 
understand?” was not enough to prove compliance. 
Rather, at the very least, the officer should have 
asked the young person to explain in their own 
words what the rights mean and the consequences 
of waiving them. The judge then ruled the 
statement inadmissible. The Crown appealed to the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that the judge erred in ruling the statement 
inadmissible because she imposed an obligation on 
the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the young person in fact understood the 
explanation. 
reasonable and probable grounds, believed that 
to be the case... Section 254(3) requires more 
than assumptions from a police officer, it 
requires an actual belief, based on reasonable 
and probable grounds, that the offense was 
committed within the preceding three hours... 
[references and quotes omitted, paras 11, 12, 13]
And further:
I disagree with the trial judge that in these 
circumstances a natural inference can be drawn 
from the evidence that [the officer] 
subjectively believed that an accident had 
occurred in the three hours before he gave the 
demand. It might be that the officer made the 
demand because he felt that [the accused] had 
been driving while impaired within the last 
three hours but it may also be that the officer 
simply did not address his mind to the time 
element. Crown Counsel did not ask the critical 
question. The question remains whether there 
is any piece of evidence upon which an inference 
could be drawn that [the officer] had 
addressed his mind 
to this issue?
Did anybody tell [the 
officer] when the 
accident happened? 
There is no evidence 
that he talked to 
[the other driver involved in the accident] 
about it. We do not know what the dispatcher 
told [the officer]. A court cannot infer in a 
vacuum what was in the mind of the police 
officer. In some cases there may be indicia that 
the officer actually turned his mind to the time 
issue but, in this case, there is no evidence that 
the officer turned his mind to the question and, 
in my opinion, the trial judge erred in inferring 
subjective reasonable grounds to the officer.
In my respectful view, it was not open for the 
trial judge, on the evidence before him, to 
conclude that the demanding officer had an 
honest belief that [the accused] had committed 
an offence under s. 253 within the preceding 
three hours when he made the breathalyser 
demand. ... [references omitted, paras. 16-18]
Since the demand did not comply with s.254(3) it 
was unlawful and the Crown could not rely on the 
presumption found in s.258(1)(c) of the Criminal 
Code. The accused’s appeal was allowed and an 
acquittal was entered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“A court cannot infer 
in a vacuum what was 
in the mind of the 
police officer.”
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among other things, the practices and methods 
of the person "in authority" in obtaining the 
statement, and the basis for his conclusion that
the explanation of his or her rights was clear 
and appropriate for the particular young person 
to whom it was given. [para. 25]
For the purposes of waiver under s.146(4) the 
Crown is required to satisfy a judge that the young 
person understood their rights and the effect of 
waiving those rights. Justice Oland wrote:
...Section 146(4) allows a young person to waive 
his or her rights, but requires that the waiver 
either be recorded or be in writing and include 
a statement signed by the young person that he 
or she had been informed of the right waived. 
An understanding of the right must precede a 
waiver of that right. In other words, unless he 
or she appreciates what is being waived, a young 
person cannot give a valid waiver. Accordingly, 
when it alleges that a young person waived a 
right, the Crown must satisfy the judge that 
the young person understood what that right 
was and the effect that waiver will have on that 
right... [para. 34]
The standard of proof placed on Crown in 
establishing compliance with s.146(4) is not proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a probability 
standard. 
Since the judge’s decision to exclude the accused’s 
statement was based on legal errors the Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a 
new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Justice Oland, authoring the judgment of the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal, agreed with the Crown. 
In addition to the protections provided by the 
Charter for all persons, young persons also receive 
special protections under s.146 of the YCJA when 
questioned by police or other person’s in authority. 
This provision outlines what is required before a 
statement made by a young person is admissible 
(s.146(2)(b)) and necessitates that any waiver must 
be recorded on video tape, audio tape, or in writing 
(s.146(4)).  
Justice Oland ruled that the Crown does not need 
to prove the young person actually understood the 
explanations given by police. Nor is there a 
requirement that the young person re-cite or 
explain his understanding back to the police. 
Rather, the Crown only needs to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the explanation was clear and 
in language appropriate to the young person’s age 
and understanding. Justice Oland stated:
Section 146(2)(b) stipulates that certain rights 
must be "clearly explained to the young person 
in language appropriate to his or her age and 
understanding." A plain reading of that 
provision shows that the legislative intent was 
not directed to an inquiry into whether or not 
the young person understood those rights. The 
test was not, as the judge stated here, whether 
"the young person clearly understood his or her 
rights" or whether he "fully understood his 
rights and options." Rather, what was intended 
was an inquiry pertaining to the clarity of the 
explanation. This would take into account, 
STATEMENT ONUS & BURDEN GRID
Issue Onus Burden
Voluntariness
(Common law)
Crown Crown must prove statement made to police was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.. If Crown 
cannot prove statement was voluntary, the statement is inadmissible at common law. (see for 
example R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 88)
Right to Silence
(Charter s.7)
Accused Accused must prove on a balance of probabilities that their s.7 Charter right was violated. If accused 
proves Charter right violated, court will engage in a s.24 Charter enquiry.  (see for example R. v. 
Hebert, (1990) 2 S.C.R. 151)
Right to Counsel
(Charter s.10(b))
Accused Accused must prove on a balance of probabilities that their s.10(b) Charter right was violated. If 
accused proves Charter right violated, court will engage in a s.24 Charter enquiry. (see for example 
R. v. Manninen, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 1233)
Youth Statement Explanation
(Youth Criminal Justice Act s.146(2)(b))
Crown Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the explanation given to an accused youth was 
clear and in language appropriate to the youth’s age and understanding.  The Crown need not 
prove the young person actually understood the explanation. (see R. v. L.T.H., 2006 NSCA 409)
Youth Statement Waiver
(Youth Criminal Justice Act s.146(4))
Crown Crown must prove on a balance of probabilities that the young person understood what right they 
were waiving and the effect of the waiver will have on that right.. (see R. v. L.T.H., 2006 NSCA 409)
www.10-8.ca
23
Volume 7 Issue 1
January/February 2007
Female officers accounted for 6% of senior 
officers, 11% of non-commissioned officers, and 21% 
of constables. 
The RCMP had the largest presence in British 
Columbia with 5,355 officers, followed by Alberta 
(2,328), Ontario (1,310) and Saskatchewan (1,142). 
COPS ACROSS CANADA
According to a 2006 report released by Statistics 
Canada there were 62,458 police officers across 
Canada last year. Ontario had the most officers 
(23,759) while the Yukon had the least (116) (see 
map below for all provincial/territorial numbers). 
With a population of 32,501,100, Canada’s average  
cop per pop ratio was 192 police officers per 
100,000 residents.
There were 11,211 
female officers 
accounting for 18% 
overall. British 
Columbia had the 
greatest percentage 
of female officers 
(21.4%) while Prince 
Edward Island had 
the lowest (13.6%). 
BC
7,678
ON
23,759
MN
2,313
SK
2,030
AB
5,604
YK
116
QU
15,096
NU
122NWT
171 NF
799
NB
1,291
NS
1,667
PEI
220
In 2005, the total expenditures on policing was $9,281,569,000
Canada’s Largest Municipal Police Services 2006
Service Officers % Female
Toronto, ON 5,371 16%
Montreal, QU 4,346 28%
Peel Regional, ON 1,667 16%
Calgary, AB 1,599 13%
Edmonton, AB 1,356 16%
Vancouver, BC 1,303 20%
Winnipeg, MN 1,262 14%
York Regional, ON 1,174 16%
Ottawa, ON 1,138 21%Source: Statistics Canada, 2006, 
Police Resources in Canada, 
Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
RCMP ‘HQ’ & 
Training Academy 
1,592
2006 Police Officers by Gender, Canada
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
331
Quebec Provincial Police
5,177
Ontario Provincial Police
5,426
CANADA:
By the Numbers
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POLICE MAY PERSUADE 
DETAINEE TO VOLUNTARILY 
BREAK SILENCE
R. v. Singh, 2006 BCCA 281
The accused was arrested three days 
after a man was killed. The man shot 
was standing inside the door of a pub 
when he was struck by a stray bullet 
fired from outside the pub. There had been an 
argument between a group of men and pub staff and 
the shot had been fired at a pub employee standing 
outside the pub. No weapon was recovered and 
there was no forensic evidence. However, 
surveillance video inside the pub caught the initial 
argument on tape along with the men walking 
towards the exit doors. A police officer also took 
surveillance photographs of the accused at another 
pub the following day and subsequently identified 
him as one of the men in the video from the pub 
shooting. As well, the intended victim of the 
shooting identified the accused as the shooter.
The accused was interviewed twice by police 
following his arrest. Both interviews were video and 
audio taped. The first interview in the evening 
lasted 70 minutes while a second interview the 
following morning lasted 47 minutes. Before the 
first interview the accused was given 
a Charter warning and spoke to a 
lawyer twice; once by telephone and 
again in a meeting. During the first 
interview the accused tried to end the 
interview between 15 and 20 times by 
saying he did not want to talk about 
the incident or didn’t know anything 
about the incident and by asking to be 
returned to his cell. Each time the 
investigator continued to talk, 
outlining what the police knew about the shooting 
and inviting comment. The accused admitted he had 
been to the pub and identified himself as one of the 
persons seen in the pub video. The accused did not 
confess to the crime and the interview ended 
shortly afterwards. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused argued the statements he made to police 
were involuntary and violated his right to remain 
silent under s.7 of the Charter. Although he felt the 
tactics of the investigator caused him some 
concern, the trial judge admitted edited versions of 
the statements. In his view, the accused’s right to 
talk or to remain silent was not undermined or 
overborne by the investigator’s admitted dedication 
to put part of the police case against the accused in 
an effort to get him to confess, no matter what. 
The accused’s admission that he was the person in 
the video was freely made and did not result from 
the police breaking down his desire to maintain 
silence. As the trial judge noted, the investigator’s 
persuasion did not deny the accused the right to 
choose to speak to police or deprive him of an 
operating mind. The Crown tendered only the first 
statement made to police to the jury and the 
accused was convicted of second degree murder. 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that once a detainee states 
he does not want to make a statement he has 
exercised his right to remain silent under s.7 of the 
Charter and any further police conduct, like 
persistent questioning, violates that right. In his 
view, once he asserted his right to silence the police 
must stop their efforts in getting an admission. 
Furthermore, he submitted that the strategy 
employed by the investigator denied him the choice 
to remain silent. 
Justice Mackenzie, authoring the 
unanimous decision, first found that 
“the police are not precluded from using 
reasonable persuasion to encourage a 
detained person to break his silence 
after his right to silence has been 
asserted following the exercise of the 
right to counsel.” In this case, “the 
officer used a sophisticated technique 
of persuasion but the [accused] knew he 
was talking to a police officer and he was not under 
any misapprehension of his position.” This is 
different than a situation where the police 
introduce an undercover police officer into a cell in 
the guise of a fellow prisoner to trick the detainee 
into thinking he was talking to another prisoner and 
not the police. This was an investigative interview 
where the accused was aware he was in the 
presence of a police officer. 
“Police techniques that 
are intended to 
persuade a detained 
person to voluntarily 
break his silence 
normally do not offend 
a basic sense of 
fairness.”
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As for the “stratagem” employed by the 
investigator, he was trying to persuade the accused 
to talk despite his resistance for the most part. 
However, the accused’s right to choose was not 
overborne. Justice Mackenzie stated:
Police techniques that are intended to persuade a 
detained person to voluntarily break his silence 
normally do not offend a basic sense of fairness.  
Here both interviews were videotaped and the 
trial judge was in an excellent position to assess 
the fairness of the process.  In my view, there 
was no error of law or principle in the trial judge’s 
approach to the issue, and there are no grounds 
to disturb his factual conclusion that the 
interview technique employed by [the 
investigator] was a legitimate technique of 
persuasion.  It was not unfair.  [para. 20]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
DELAY IN SEARCHING 
INCIDENT TO ARREST 
EXPLAINED 
R. v. Cheng, 2006 BCSC 1835
Just before 1:00 am a police officer 
was fueling up her unmarked police car 
at a a self-serve gas station when she 
saw a Subaru Legacy pull up beside a 
GMC Jimmy parked in a parking lot across the 
street. The occupants were noisy and appeared to 
be partying. A rear passenger in the Subaru waved 
to the GMC in a beckoning motion. Using binoculars, 
the officer obtained the licence number of the 
vehicle and learned the GMC was registered to the 
accused, who had an extensive criminal record 
including a conviction for trafficking. The accused 
then exited the passenger side of the Subaru and 
got into the driver’s door of the GMC. The vehicles 
then left.
The officer stopped the GMC and detained the 
accused for investigation of drug trafficking. She 
asked for and took his keys so he wouldn’t flee. 
Meanwhile, other officers located and pulled over 
the Subaru and learned the driver had purchased a 
small rock of cocaine for $20. This drug was turned 
over to police. Within 20 minutes, the officer 
detaining the accused learned the occupants of the 
Subaru had purchased a rock of cocaine. The 
officer determined she had reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused and did so, handcuffing and 
turning him over to another officer. 
The arresting officer was then called away to 
investigate a robbery, returning about 30 minutes 
later to search the vehicle. She testified she 
wanted to search the vehicle to find evidence 
relating to drug trafficking, like the $20 bill used 
to purchase the cocaine. A small amount of 
marihuana was found, a torn lottery sheet, and a cell 
phone. The officer wanted a police dog to search 
the vehicle but it was busy at the robbery call. The 
vehicle was towed to a compound where it was 
searched again at 3:30 am, using the police dog. The 
dog indicated on the driver’s seat back, through 
where the seatbelt exits the seat. A wad of cash 
was removed from this location containing 2 x $50, 
21 x $20, 15 x $10 and 7 x $5. A second wad of cash 
was seen nearby but the seat had to be cut to 
remove it. Above the cash was a duct taped envelope 
with seven flaps of heroin (1.5 grams each) and a 
rock of cocaine and a second paper envelope with 
four flaps of cocaine (4 grams each). 
The Arrest
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused argued, in part, that the police did not have 
the necessary grounds to make the arrest. In 
assessing whether the requisite grounds existed, 
Justice Myers explained what was required:
In order for an arrest to be lawful there must be 
a subjective belief of the person who authorized 
the arrest that there was reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest.  As well, those 
grounds must be justifiable from an objective 
point of view.  The police do not have to go so far 
as to establish a prima facie case against the 
accused to justify the arrest. [reference 
omitted, para. 39]
In this case, the officer had the necessary grounds 
from both a subjective and objective point of view. 
This included the brief meeting in the parking lot 
where the businesses were closed, the hand 
beckoning motion, the occupants of the Subarau 
“whooping it up”, the vehicles heading off after the 
meeting, the accused’s criminal record with a 
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conviction for trafficking, and the Subaru driver’s 
statement he purchased a rock of cocaine and 
handing it over to police. Justice Myers said:
In my view the view of [the officer] was also 
justifiable from an objective point of view.  The 
factors taken into consideration by her would not 
provide sufficient grounds on their own, but that 
is not the test.   They are to be considered 
cumulatively… The police are entitled to “put two 
plus two together” [references omitted, para. 44]
The Search
When searching as an incident to arrest the police 
must be attempting to achieve some valid purpose 
connected to the arrest such as:
• the safety of the public and the police;
• the protection of evidence from destruction; and
• the discovery of evidence which can be used at 
trial. 
Here the officer said she wanted to find the $20 
used to buy the cocaine. This subjective purpose 
was to uncover evidence which could be used at trial 
and was also objectively reasonable. 
The accused also submitted that there was no risk 
that evidence would disappear and there was enough 
time to get a warrant. Justice Myers, however, 
rejected this assertion:
The delay itself – approximately 90 minutes – was 
not long.... Had the dog been available at the scene 
of the arrest the search would have been made 
then.   In my view, the delay in conducting the 
search in this case 
was explicable and 
reasonable and 
does not lead me 
to draw an 
inference that the 
search was done 
for an improper 
purpose.
Turning to the 
area of the 
search, in a search 
incident to arrest, the police are entitled to 
search the interior of the vehicle which the 
accused occupied at the time of the arrest as well 
as the trunk…
[…]
In this case, a visual observation disclosed that 
there was cash hidden in the seatbelt area.  When 
that was removed further objects could be seen 
above it.  They could not be reached by hand, and 
the upholstery was cut.  Under the circumstances 
I do not find that to be unreasonable. [references 
omitted, paras. 50-53]
The accused was convicted.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EVIDENCE SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO ARREST MUST BE RELATED 
TO ARREST 
R. v. Wilson, 
(2006) Docket:C41549 (OntCA)
After the accused was pulled over by 
Toronto police a CPIC search was 
conducted. It was learned he was on a 
recognizance for possessing 
marihuana, weapons, assault, and attempted murder 
charges. Conditions included not to be in Toronto 
except for school, court, or to meet counsel and not 
to have a cell phone or pager in his possession. A cell 
phone was seen in the accused’s left front pocket; 
he was arrested and charged with breach of 
recognizance. Unbeknownst to police, the cell phone 
condition had been deleted two months earlier. 
The accused was patted down and $2,315.16 was 
found in his pockets. He was placed in the rear of 
the police car and advised of his right to counsel. 
During the pat down and while seated in the police 
car the accused was fixated on his vehicle. Police 
searched his car and found a Kentucky Fried 
Chicken bag containing 54.62 grams of crack 
cocaine. He was charged with possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds 
of crime (the money).
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
the accused argued his arrest for breach of 
recognizance was unlawful because the cell phone 
condition violation had been removed and the 
officers never asked the accused why he was in 
Toronto to determine whether he fell within any of 
the exceptions to the order. The trial judge 
however, ruled the arrest lawful. “The test…is 
“...in a search incident to 
arrest, the police are 
entitled to search the 
interior of the vehicle 
which the accused 
occupied at the time of 
the arrest as well as the 
trunk….”
www.10-8.ca
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whether the arresting officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds for believing that a criminal 
offence occurred, or was to occur,” said the judge. 
“The reasonableness of the belief is based on an 
objective common-sense review of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of 
the arrest.” 
In this case, there was no statistical evidence 
concerning the reliability or unreliability of CPIC 
information. The officer did however, describe 
CPIC as generally reliable and a useful tool. Further, 
the accused never told the officers that the cell 
phone condition had been deleted nor his purpose 
for being in Toronto. The trial judge stated:
I agree with the Defence that it would be cause 
for concern if the computers were not properly 
and regularly updated. An error must be assessed, 
however, within the context of the particular 
circumstances of any particular case. In this case, 
the fact that there was technically and in reality 
no breach of the cellphone term in the 
recognizance does not in my view raise the matter 
to the level of a constitutional infringement or 
this has not been proven on a balance of 
probabilities. In this case, both subjective and 
objective elements of the Storrey test have been 
satisfied. Not only did the officer have subjective 
grounds for the arrest, but a reasonable person 
standing in his shoes would also find that he acted 
reasonably in ordering that the [accused] be 
placed under arrest for breach of recognizance. 
Accordingly, I find no violation of the [accused’s] 
s. 9 Charter rights in that regard.[ para. 55]
As for the search of the vehicle, the judge found it 
was incidental to the arrest. Police are entitled to 
search as an incident to arrest for their safety or 
the safety of the public, to protect evidence from 
destruction, and to discover evidence to be used at 
trial. The trial judge held:
Clearly, the police, in conducting the search, were 
attempting to achieve a valid objective connected 
to the arrest within the meaning of the relevant 
jurisprudence. In the circumstances, I find that 
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to 
justify a search of the vehicle and a reasonable 
prospect of securing evidence of illegal activity. 
The search itself was unobtrusive and reasonably 
performed. Given the actions of the [accused], 
the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle, 
particularly this vehicle of which the [accused] 
was not the owner, the non-conscriptive nature of 
the evidence, its positioning in front of and within 
reach of the applicant (though not in plain view) 
and the good faith of the police officers, the 
warrantless search was, I find, a justifiable use 
of police powers.[para 61]
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the vehicle search 
violated s.8 of the Charter. The Court however, 
rejected the appeal:
The events that transpired [after the initial 
vehicle stop] were lawful. The [accused] 
appeared to be in breach of his bail giving the 
officer reasonable grounds to arrest. The search 
of the interior of the vehicle was justified as a 
search incident to arrest. The trial judge 
overstated the search power by stating that it 
could be justified to search for securing 
evidence of “illegal activity”. However there was 
evidence to sustain a proper search incident to 
arrest for the purpose of securing evidence of 
the two apparent breaches of the recognizance. 
Accordingly there was no violation of s. 8 of the 
Charter. [para. 2]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (a) True —see R. v. Aslam (at p. 7 of this 
publication).
2. (b) False—see R. v. Goodine (at p. 8 of this 
publication). 
3. (b) False—see R. v. Houben (at p. 15 of this 
publication). 
4. (a) True—see R. v. Searle (at p. 20 of this 
publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. Singh (at p. 24 of this 
publication). 
  Note-able Quote
Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is the 
courage to continue that counts - Winston Churchill
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owner of the vehicle taken into possession, liable 
for the costs and charges incident to the moving 
and storage of the vehicle, and provides the 
necessary reimbursement mechanisms for such 
moving and storage charges from the owner of 
the vehicle.
In my respectful view, those provisions of the 
Act are clearly and unambiguously not meant to 
apply to a case, such as this one, where police 
officers are called to the scene of an accident 
involving a vehicle and become involved in what is 
essentially a rescue operation. Under such 
circumstances, the peace officers simply cannot 
reasonably be considered as having “discovered” 
or come upon a “vehicle that apparently has 
been involved in an accident and is a menace 
to traffic” as envisaged in section 196(2).
There is another obvious reason why the 
[plaintiff’s] claim could not be allowed. Under 
section 197(2) of the Act, the owner of the 
vehicle taken into custody is only liable for 
the costs and charges incident to the moving 
and storage of the seized vehicle. In this case, 
the [plaintiff’s] claim is for diving charges 
incurred in locating the vehicle. In my view, 
assuming that the [plaintiff] is entitled to recoup 
the payments made to the diving team by an 
action, rather than through the enforcement 
mechanisms provided for in section 197, the 
diving charges clearly do 
not constitute “moving” or 
“storage” charges 
contemplated in section 
197(1) of the Act.
In my respectful view, 
the interpretation the 
[plaintiff] would give to 
the relevant provisions, 
namely, that the peace 
officers in this case “discovered” [the owner’s] 
vehicle under water, that the vehicle had 
apparently been involved in an accident and was a 
menace to traffic, and that the diving charges 
involved in locating the vehicle constitute 
“moving” or “storage” charges is not a sensible 
interpretation and is simply not compatible with 
the modern and overarching principle of 
statutory interpretation… [references omitted, 
paras. 10-13]
The Board of Commissioner’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DIVING TO LOCATE VEHICLE 
NOT PART OF MOVING or 
STORAGE
Rothesay Regional Joint Board of Police 
Commissioners v. Carr, 
2006 NBCA 121
Police received an emergency call that 
a vehicle had entered a river where a 
ferry loaded vehicles and a rescue 
operation was quickly organized. A 
private dive team was called to assist but the 
vehicle with the body of 
its driver was not located 
until the following day. 
The dive team also helped 
bring the vehicle to 
shore. The vehicle was 
subsequently released to 
the car owner’s insurer who paid the towing and 
storage charges. The police were billed $12,082.19 
for the dive team but believed the owner of the car 
(mother of the deceased) was liable for the 
expenses under the provisions of ss.196(2) and 
197(1) of New Brunswick’s Motor Vehicle Act, so 
they sued. 
At trial in the New Brunswick Court of 
Queen’s Bench the judge dismissed the 
claim. The plaintiff Board of 
Commissioners appealed to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal contending 
the Motor Vehicle Act created a 
statutory obligation on the registered 
owner to pay for the diving services. 
Justice Deschenes, with Justices 
Drapeau and Larlee concurring, agreed with the 
trial judge’s disposition of the matter. In 
Justice Deschenes’ view, ss. 196 and 197 of the 
Motor Vehicle Act did not make the registered 
owner liable for the diving charges. He stated:
In general terms, the provisions invoked by the 
[plaintiff] are meant to cover situations where a 
peace officer comes upon a vehicle under 
circumstances described earlier, including a 
vehicle that apparently has been involved in an 
accident and is a menace to traffic. The section 
gives the officer the statutory right to move the 
vehicle and store it. Section 197 then makes the 
196(2) Motor Vehicle Act
 ... any peace officer upon discovery of 
any   vehicle ... that apparently has been 
involved in an accident and that is a 
menace to traffic ... shall take such 
vehicle into his custody and shall deal 
with the same as provided in section 197.
197(1) Motor Vehicle Act
A vehicle detained, seized, impounded or 
taken into custody of law under this Act, shall 
be stored in such place as the Minister or 
the Registrar may direct and the owner of 
such vehicle at the time of such detention, 
seizure, impounding or taking into custody 
shall be liable for the costs and charges for 
the storage and moving thereof.
